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This paper describes the rise of a new form of regulatory havens.
Jurisdictions that have traditionally been characterized as “tax havens” are
gradually becoming hubs for blockchain-based ventures. These jurisdictions
attract blockchain entrepreneurs by offering refuge from regulatory and tax
burdens imposed by developed economies. These new “Blockchain Havens”
create a regulatory “race to the bottom” that is traditionally associated with
the world of international tax evasion and avoidance.
Over the past several years, developed economies have put to use—
mostly through coordinated efforts—several regulatory frameworks aimed to
address some of the negative effects of tax havens. These regulatory
instruments are aimed against the haven jurisdictions themselves, or the
private institutions operating in such jurisdictions. However, this paper
argues that the unique nature of blockchain-based technology – most
importantly, decentralization and temper resistance – makes such traditional
anti tax haven policies ineffective in the blockchain context.
This paper argues that coordinated international regulatory policies
must be quickly developed to address certain important aspects of blockchain
technology. Such coordination is necessary to prevent an uncontrolled
regulatory race to the bottom, while at the same time preserving the benefits
of blockchain-based applications.
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Blockchain Havens
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, several countries have been engaged in a race to
become leading hubs for blockchain technology. 1 For example, Switzerland
recently launched a government-backed consortium intended to support “the
development of Blockchain and cryptographic related technologies and
businesses.” 2 The Cayman Islands has created a dedicated economic zone—
the Cayman Enterprise City—that caters, among others, to blockchain
entrepreneurs. 3 The Maltese government adopted policies aiming to make
Malta “one of the world’s friendliest jurisdictions” 4 for cryptocurrencies, and
in February of 2018, the Marshall Islands became the first nation to launch a
sovereign cryptocurrency. 5
If you find something in common among the jurisdictions mentioned, you
are not mistaken. Many of the countries making significant strides in this
quickly-developing sector of the economy 6 are well-known centers of
offshore financing, where bank secrecy and tax relief are essential
commodities. 7 They are popularly known as “tax havens.” Tax haven
jurisdictions are not the only ones engaged in an attempt to recruit blockchain
companies, but they seem to be significantly outweighing their size in the
world economy in this context.8
It is a familiar experience. These offshore financial centers try to appeal
to blockchain entrepreneurs mostly by offering secrecy, light-touch
1
See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Have a Cryptocurrency Company? Bermuda, Malta or
TIMES
(July
29,
2018),
Gibraltar
Wants
You,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/29/technology/cryptocurrency-bermuda-maltagibraltar.html; Don Tapscott, Who will Win the Worldcup of Blockchain?, QUARTZ (June 27,
2018), https://qz.com/1315302/who-would-win-the-world-cup-of-blockchain/.
2
William Suberg, Switzerland Launches Crypto Valley Association Backed by
Government, COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 1, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/switzerlandlaunches-crypto-valley-association-backed-by-government.
3
Ken Silva, Cayman Courting Blockchain Companies, CAYMAN COMPASS (Jan. 30,
2018),
https://www.caymancompass.com/2018/01/30/cayman-courting-blockchaincompanies/.
4
Viren Vghela & Andrea Tan, How Malta Became a Hub of the Cryptocurrency World,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-23/howmalta-became-a-hub-of-the-cryptocurrency-world-quicktake.
5
Declaration and Issuance of the Sovereign Currency Act Bill 2018, Nitijela Bill
125ND2 pt. 3 (RMI).
6
See PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE
OF CODE 3 (2018) (“In just a few years the reach of blockchain has rapidly extended beyond
payment and financial products, helping to support new autonomous systems that structure
social and economic interactions with less of a need for intermediaries.”).
7
Eric Czuleger, The Tiny Nations Plotting to Become Tax Havens for Cryptocurrencies,
OZY (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/the-tiny-nations-plotting-tobecome-tax-havens-for-cryptocurrencies/88846.
8
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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regulation, and minimal taxation. 9 The haven jurisdictions thus reap the
benefits of incorporation 10. Some commentators therefore refer to these
jurisdictions as “Cryptocurrency Havens,” 11 or “Blockchain Havens.” 12 In
this paper I opt for the term “Blockchain Havens”, as such terminology
encompasses all potential applications of blockchain technology. The term
“Cryptocurrency Havens”, on the other hand, suggests a narrow focus of the
use of crypto-tokens as currencies.
This paper describes the rise of tax haven jurisdictions as leaders in
blockchain technology development, and their manifestation as so-called
Blockchain Havens. The paper also explores the normative and practical
ramifications of this phenomenon.
The paper posits that one of the main reasons for this phenomenon is the
increasingly successful battle of developed economies against tax havens’
traditional role as facilitators of tax avoidance and evasion. 13 In recent years,
developed economies have instituted multitude of laws, and engaged in
multiple international initiatives to undo the perceived damages caused by
tax havens. 14 For example, in 2010, the United States adopted the Foreign
Accounts Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”), 15 forcing certain financial
institutions to deliver information about their account holders to the IRS, or
face debilitating financial consequences in the United Sates. 16 The FACTA
framework was adopted by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to develop the “Common Reporting Standards”
(CRS), 17 which include an international standard for automatic exchange of
taxpayer information between governments. As of the drafting of this article,
over 100 jurisdictions have adopted instruments committing to exchange
See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56
INT’L ORG. 151 (2002) (describing tax havens’ business model of sovereignty
commercialization).
10
Such as incorporation fees and passive investment associated with it.
11
Darryn Pollock, Which Countries are Best to Start Blockchain Projects,
COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/which-countries-are-bestto-start-blockchain-projects.
12
Yoav Vilner, Bill Clinton Speaks at 'Swell by Ripple' as Regulatory Concerns Grow,
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/yoavvilner/2018/10/03/bill-clintonspeaks-at-swell-by-ripple-as-regulatory-concerns-grow/#6e06584e22fc.
13
For a summary of recent coordinated efforts to battle offshore tax havens, see Itai
Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016); Itai
Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304 (2012).
14
See discussion infra Part III.B.
15
Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2012).
16
Generally, under FATCA, a foreign financial institution (FFI) must agree to deliver
certain information to the IRS on the FFI’s U.S. account holders, or face a 30% gross tax on
the FFI’s U.S. earnings.
17
OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT
INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS (2nd ed. 2017).
9
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information based on the CRS system. 18 The European Union has also
adopted several measures over the past several years to facilitate automatic
exchange of taxpayer information between member states. 19 These
international and national actions undermine the main value the tax havens
offer to tax evaders: no taxes and financial secrecy.
It is meaningful that these anti tax haven actions are not targeting--at list
not directly--tax evaders or avoiders themselves. Rather, these measures
target intermediaries that are in a position to collect information about tax
evaders: tax havens’ governments, and tax havens’ financial institutions. In
this environment, the rise of the blockchain technology is like a godsend for
tax cheats and for tax havens. Blockchain, in its very essence, is a
decentralized ledger that documents ownership and transfers, but does not
require transacting parties to identify themselves to one another. 20 Secrecy is
back in play, but this time with no need for intermediaries.
The blockchain financial ecosystem may thus offer similar advantages to
the ones traditionally offered by tax havens. 21 First, it allows for the parties
to financial transfers to remain rather anonymous, though not completely. 22
Second, since Blockchain technology operates in a decentralized manner,
there is no centralized government or other institution that may impose tax.
However, blockchain cannot simply replace tax havens. Any application,
even if it is decentralized, needs to start somehow, somewhere, by someone.
There needs to be an initial entrepreneur, some sort of initial infrastructure
(computers, servers, programmers), and most importantly, there is a need to
raise initial capital. Even if blockchain itself is “immune” from regulation,
the creation of a blockchain venture and the process of fundraising may
themselves be regulated. This is where blockchain havens come into this new
financial ecosystem.
Instead of offering regulatory refuge themselves (because they no longer
can), traditional havens offer regulatory refuge to blockchain companies.
Stated differently, the new havens offer regulatory refuge to the technology
CRS MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT (2018) [hereinafter
MCAA].
19
EUROPEAN COMM'N, TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, THE ANTI TAX AVOIDANCE
DIRECTIVE (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-taxavoidance-package/anti-tax-avoidance-directive_en.
20
For a discussion on the anonymity provided by blockchain ledgers, see FILIPPI &
WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 43–45.
21
Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 38, 39 (2013) (“Cryptocurrencies possess the traditional characteristics of tax
havens: earnings are not subject to taxation and taxpayers’ anonymity is maintained.”).
22
Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 53, 57 (2015) (“It should be noted, however, that most
cryptocurrencies are not completely anonymous, but rather are pseudonymous.”).
18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357168

Draft of Mar. 17, 2019
Blockchain Havens

5

that offers regulatory refuge. In a sense, Cryptocurrency Havens are “meta
tax-havens” or “meta offshore financial centers.” As developed economies
act against haven governments, it seems that haven jurisdictions are
responding by becoming hosts to technologies that offer traditional havenlike benefits.
One might ask, is this necessarily a bad thing? The answer is absolutely
not. Blockchain technology offer many potential benefits. 23 However, it also
possesses unique risks. Most importantly for this paper, is the fact that
blockchain transactions cannot be reversed, and can serve as a platform for
automated execution. 24 Thus, when haven governments offer very light
regulatory touch, they may attract bad actors who may utilize the regulatory
leniency to misuse blockchain technology. In such a case, even if the illicit
act is identified, there is little that can be done. The bad actor can get the illicit
gain and disappear thanks to anonymity feature embedded in the technology,
and the victim has no recourse given the permanent nature of blockchain
transactions.
Consider for example a fraudulent transfer of funds facilitated by a havenbased blockchain technology. If the victim is a U.S. citizen, for example, she
has no recourse. There is no way to undo the transaction. And, because of the
decentralized nature of blockchain there is no intermediary involved, which
may otherwise provide relief, for example, through insurance proceeds. There
is nothing the haven government can do, even if it wanted to, because it
cannot “undo” the transaction. Punishing or regulating haven government or
financial institutions is thus futile.
If such problems became prevalent, developed economies may have no
choice but to respond with a heavy hand. If the blockchain-based transaction
cannot be undone, the only way to address bad actors is to prevent the
transaction for taking place in the first place. Since the system is
decentralized, there is no one actor a developed government can regulate. It
can only go after the blockchain infrastructure, for example, by shutting down
internet traffic into the country from servers associated with certain with
problematic activity. Such action may prove over-inclusive, and result in the
loss of the many positive attributes of blockchain technology. In order to
prevent such bleak future, this paper offers a cooperative international
framework for a cross-border blockchain regulation that would discourage
illicit use of blockchain and allow some form of recourse to victims of bad
actors, regardless of the victim’s location and identity.
This paper continues as follows: Part I outlines the nature of blockchain
as an autonomous regulatory haven. Part II explain the demise of the
traditional tax haven business model. Part III explains the rise of Blockchain
23
24

See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part V.
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Havens. Part IV considers the ramifications of Blockchain Havens in the
absence of a regulatory framework. That part identifies the unique properties
of blockchain technology that make Blockchain Havens problematic. Part V
offers some ideas for a cooperative international framework to regulate
blockchain based applications.
II. BLOCKCHAIN AS AN AUTONOMOUS REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT
A. Blockchain and Private Regulation
In its essence, blockchain is a decentralized ledger that records ownership
and value transfers. 25 As such, Blockchain provides a platform for
autonomously-executed applications. For example, users can program a
contractual arrangement onto the blockchain, coding-in triggering event to
upon which contractual provisions are executed. 26 Since the contractual
execution is decentralized, neither of the parties to the contract can prevent
execution if a triggering event occurs.
For example, blockchain-based applications can assure that inheritance
funds are transferred to an heir only upon her reaching the age of 21. Unless
otherwise coded, upon her reaching to 21 year of age she will receive the
funds and no one person will be able to prevent the transfer. Partnership
profits can be automatically distributed to partners once certain profitability
targets are met. The ignition of a car can be programed to work once a
complete transfer of funds from the car buyer’s bank account to the seller’s
account. Blockchain technology thus creates “order without law and
implement what can be thought of as private regulatory framework.” 27 Rules
can be privately-created, and automatically executed. In theory, these is no
need for state (or private intermediary) intervention.
Countries have been struggling with how to regulate this new platform,
as it holds both promises and significant risks 28. Autonomous
decentralization can eliminate costly intermediaries from contractual process,
reducing transaction costs. The system is almost tamper-proof, because no
one person controls the process. For the same reason, blockchain
technologies significantly limit the ability of bad actors to restrict the flow of
information.
On the other hand, governments lose much of their ability to regulate
processes, or prevent undesired outcomes. This may enable illicit activity—
I.

For an explanation of the operation of blockchain technology, see FILIPPI & WRIGHT,
supra note 6, at 13–57.
26
Id. at 43–45.
27
Id. at 5.
28
For a discussion of the dual nature of blockchain, as a force of both good and evil, see
id. at 45–46.
25
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such as money laundering, transfers that violate IP rights, or illicit
contracts—to operate undetected. Even if detected, it is not clear what
governments can do about it, because a decentralized process cannot just be
“stopped.” Indeed, there is evidence that cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin—
the most well-known application of blockchain—are favorite among illicit
actors. 29
Different jurisdictions have responded with widely varied regulatory
approaches to blockchain. A recent global survey by the international law
firm Pinsent Masons documents five different categories of regulatory
response, from complete regulatory obliviousness on the one end, to an
outright ban on blockchain-based ventures on the other. 30 In the next subpart,
I use the global Initial Coin Offerings (“ICO”) market to demonstrate the
confused regulatory response.
B. The ICO Market as a Case Study
ICOs are blockchain-based crowdfunding platforms. In an ICO, a
promoter issues a blockchain-based digital token in exchange for value. The
token “imbue[s] holders with certain rights, privileges, or rewards within the
context of particular online application or service.” 31 In theory, since the
privileges are blockchain-based, the rights of token-holder are automatically
preserved. This can be a powerful governance instrument.
There are multiple types of ICOs and tokens. 32 For example, “utility
tokens” may allow holders access to a future product or service funded by the
ICO. 33 “Equity tokens” are similar to traditional equity, and may allow token
holders the right to vote on matters funded by the ICO, or share in the profits
of the ICO-funded venture. 34 Moreover, depending on the terms of the ICO,
token holders may (or may not) transfer their tokens exchange for valuable
considerations in a secondary market. “Currency tokens” are probably the
most well-known application of blockchain technology, and are simply used
as a medium of exchange. 35
Over the past several years the ICO market has gradually increased in
significance. One study estimated that in 2017 alone, 413 ICOs raised more

For a discussion of illicit demand for blockchain, see Shanaan Cohsey, CoinOperated Capitalism, COLUM. L. REV. 65–67 (forthcoming, 2019).
30
BITCOIN, BLOCKCHAIN AND INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS: A GLOBAL REVIEW (Pinset
Masons, 2017).
31
FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 100.
32
For a description of different types of tokens, see Dirk Zetzsche et. al., The ICO Gold
Rush: It’s a Scam, it’s a Bubble, it’s a Super Challenge for Regulators, 18 EUROPEAN BANK
INST. WORKING PAPER 7 (2018).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
29
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than $10 billion USD.36 In 2018, 1012 ICO were successful in raising funds
to the tune of $11.6 billion USD in the aggregate. While still dwarfed by
traditional capital markets, it is increasingly clear that ICOs are becoming a
popular way for entrepreneurs to raise funds. 37
ICOs do not exactly fit in to the highly-regulated framework of traditional
capital markets. There, fund raising efforts start with a business entity, with
the fiduciary duties that come with the law under which the entity is
organized. Burdensome disclosure requirements must be met to inform
potential investors of the nature of the business and the risks associated with
the investment. The exchange market themselves are heavily regulated to
prevent fraud and other abuses.
But in the ICO context there is no need for an entity to exist. There only
needs to be software. An ICO promoter can issue as many tokens as she
wants, and is only limited by the terms of the software she herself wrote (and,
of course, by the demand for her tokens). 38 The “pitch” to investors is not
done via traditional prospectus—the standards of which are heavily regulated
by securities laws—but on a “white paper.” The white paper is a document
“that describe promoters’ plans for development and solicit community
involvement.” 39 The legal status of such white papers is unclear, and there
are no market standards from what should be included in them. 40
At least initially, ICOs thus seem to have been operating in a regulatory
vacuum. While such an environment may seem alarming to some, others
view the lack of regulatory rigidity more sanguinely. “ICOs provide digital
entrepreneurs with the opportunity to raise funding avoiding costs of
compliance and intermediaries”, 41 thus providing “unprecedented liquidity
and efficiency for capital formation while minimizing transaction cost.” 42
With the rise of their popularity, various jurisdictions have started to
consider regulatory frameworks to address them. But regulatory actions have
been mostly reactive, rather than proactive. For example, in 2016, German
promoters created a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO”) by
selling virtual tokens in exchange for the cryptocurrency Ethereum (“ETH”).
ICO BENCH, ICO MARKET ANALYSIS 2018 (2018).
Nathaniel Popper, Easiest Path to Riches on the Web? An Initial Coin Offering, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/business/dealbook/coindigital-currency.html (describing the rising popularity of ICOs).
38
Cohsey et. al, supra note 29, at 21–23.
39
Id. at 18.
40
Id.
41
WINIFRED HUANG, MICHELE MEOLI & SILVIO VISMARA, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INITIAL
COIN OFFERINGS 3 (July 1, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206234.
42
Wulf Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25 Jurisdictions and their Comparative
Regulatory Responses (as of May 2018), 1 STAN. J. OF BLOCKCHAIN L. AND POL’Y (2018),
https://stanford-jblp.pubpub.org/pub/ico-comparative-reg.
36
37
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The tokens promised holders the ability to vote on profit-seeking projects
proposed to the DAO, and share in the profits generated, all through
blockchain-based automated process. 43 The DAO spectacularly failed after a
hacker was able to divert about one-third of all DAO ETH investment to
itself. 44 The DAO saga attracted the attention of the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), which—in a lengthy document—ruled
that DAO tokens are securities for U.S. securities regulation purposes. 45
Another reactive example is Shavers. 46 There, the SEC prevailed in
claiming that bitcoin is ”money” for securities fraud purposes. 47 In addition,
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) is now regulating
cryptocurrencies exchanges ad money transmitters, subjecting them to
various “know your costumer rules”. 48The IRS classified cryptocurrencies as
“property” for tax purposes, which means that any disposition of a token is a
taxable event. 49 These regulatory responses were not a result of a wellconceived policy of how to regulate blockchain, but are better described as
putting out fires.
Other countries had different experiences and have taken different
regulatory approaches. 50 Moreover, to date, there have only been sparse
coordinated efforts at establishing international regulatory standards
(discussed below). 51
At this point it is reasonable to conclude that the regulatory development
of ICO regulation is nascent, and often confusing. Most countries simply
seem to relay on existing laws and regulation, which are often not well
adapted to the blockchain technology. 52 In this regulatory environment
“almost all ICOs rely on legislative loopholes or, more accurately, what the
issuing entity hopes (or prays) is a loophole or grey area.” 53 As explained in
the Part III below, this created a perfect niche opportunity for tax haven
jurisdictions.
43
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 at 2–8 (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf.
44
Id. at 9–10.
45
Id. at 11–14.
46
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
47
Id. at 2.
48
U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS
ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES *3 (FinCEN Mar. 18,
2013), http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
49
IRS Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938, 2014 WL 1224474 (Mar. 25, 2014).
50
Kaal, supra note 42.
51
See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-151, and accompanying discussion.
52
Zetzsche et. al., supra note 32, at 24.
53
Id. at 11.
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III. THE DEMISE OF THE TRADITIONAL TAX HAVEN MODEL
Tax Havens did well for years by offering refuge from tax and regulatory
requirements of developed jurisdictions. As explained in this part, this
traditional model is no longer sustainable. The rise of blockchain technology,
however, offers tax havens a unique alternative business model.
A. The Traditional Tax Haven “Business Model”
There is no clear definition of what constitutes a “tax haven.” 54 Generally
speaking, however, jurisdictions that are traditionally referred to as “tax
havens” possess two key characteristics: very low (or no) taxes on foreign
residents, and robust financial secrecy laws. 55 Tax havens’ business model is
essentially to sell access to these commodities in exchange for fees, such as
incorporation fees.
The key draw of tax havens is that they enable taxpayers to avoid taxes
and regulation in other jurisdictions. Consider, for example, the crudest—yet
very effective—form of tax evasion: unreported income. U.S. residents must
pay tax on their worldwide income. 56 If a U.S. taxpayer holds corporate bonds
in a U.S. brokerage account, any interest received is reported to the IRS. The
owner of the account will have a very hard time hiding her income from the
IRS.
What if instead, the taxpayer creates a shell entity in a tax haven, have the
shell entity open a bank account in the tax haven in the entity’s name, and
holds corporate bonds in that account. Under the tax haven laws, income
accrued to the bank account is not taxed, and under the financial secrecy laws
of that jurisdiction, the beneficial owner of the entity is not known. Even
though the U.S. taxpayer must report the interest income and pay tax on it,
she can simply choose not to report the income. This type of evasion is a
crime, 57 but one that the IRS can do little about. The IRS will never know
about the unreported income. Whatever incorporation fees are paid by the
entity to the tax haven are functionally the cost of tax evasion to the
taxpayer. 58 But this cost is dwarfed compared to the taxes that a taxpayer
would have otherwise have to pay. This is a worthwhile exercise.
There are less nefarious forms in which tax havens operate. These require
more detailed explanation. Rather than support “evasion” as explained above,
tax havens may be instrumental in tax “avoidance.” Such tax reduction
strategies are often legal, but would not be possible without the assistance of
a friendly tax haven jurisdiction.
For purposes of this essay, I use the tax havens jurisdiction list in James. R. Hines Jr.,
Do Tax Havens Flourish?, 19 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 65 (2005).
55
Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, supra note 21.
56
26 U.S.C § 1 (2018).
57
Id. §§ 7201–07.
58
Palan, supra note 9.
54
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Consider, for example, debt/equity arbitrage. 59 Say “Parent” is a
corporation that is a tax-resident in country A, and that Parent wholly owns
“Sub,” a tax resident and operating in country B. Most jurisdictions in country
A’s position would not impose tax on dividends received by Parent from Sub,
but will impose tax on interest received by Parent from Sub. On the other
hand, most countries in B’s position would also allow the Sub to deduct
interest payments to Parent, but would not allow a deduction for dividends
from Sub to Parent. The result would be that—no matter how Parent choses
to finance Sub—tax will be paid by the Parent-Sub group in either A or B. 60
If Parent chooses to finance Sub with equity, income tax will be paid in
B. Sub will pay corporate tax on its income in B, and will receive no
deduction for dividend payment to Parent. A, on the other hand, will not
impose tax on the dividend received by Parent. If Parent elects to finance Sub
with debt, income tax is paid in A. Sub’s interest payment to Parent are
deductible in B, which eliminate much (if not all) of Sub’s income tax base
in B. The interest receipts by Parent, however, are taxable in A.
It would have been beneficial if Parent could have financed Sub with an
instrument that is classified as “equity” under the laws of A, but as “debt”
under the laws of B. Payment from Sub to A would be classified as interest
by B, and therefore deductible to Sub. Receipts by Parent would be classified
as dividends by A, thus nontaxable to Parent. In other words, income would
be taxed neither in A, nor in B. Unfortunately for Parent and Sub, most
countries classify financing instruments similarly, so this scheme is pretty
much impossible.
This is where tax haven jurisdictions can offer their services. Instead of
financing Sub directly, Parent can create “Mid,” an intermediary entity
between Parent and Sub. Mid in incorporated in H, a tax haven. Parent now
finances Sub back-to-back through Mid. H is a friendly jurisdiction, and
agrees to treat the financing instrument from Parent to Mid as debt, even
though it is substantively structured as equity. The financing instrument from
Mid to Sub is structured as debt and treated as such.
Thus, payment from Sub to Mid are deductible in B. Receipts by Mid in
H are theoretically interest income to Mid, but Mid need not worry. The
payments from Mid to Parent are treated as interest payment in H, thus
deductible to Mid. But because this instrument is, in substance, equity –
59
Omri Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 26–29 (2017) (explaining debt-equity arbitrage).
60
This principle in international taxation is known as and the expected outcome of the
“Single Tax Principle,” under which “income from cross-border transactions should be
subject to tax once (that is, neither more nor less than once).” REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH,
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX
REGIME 8 (2007).
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receipts by Parent are considered dividends in A, and as such not taxable in
A. Thus, with the help of a friendly tax haven administrator, Parent and Sub
were able to manufacture an arbitrage opportunity that did not exist
otherwise. H performs no economic role in the business of the group, except
for allowing the incorporation of Mid – a shell entity that facilitates tax
avoidance.
In exchange for the friendly treatment, H would probably ask that small
taxable “spread” (say, 0.25%) on the back-to-back payment will remain with
Mid to be taxed by H. This was in fact the exact business model employed
by Luxembourg, and exposed in a leak by an employee of the accounting firm
of PwC. 61 This leak prompted global outrage and became known as the
LuxLeaks scandal.
B. The Battle Against Tax Havens
For years, tax havens were able to successfully milk the business model
described above to the extreme at the expense of other jurisdictions.
However, these days are now coming to an end. An increased academic
attention to inequality, 62 popular outrage—driven largely by multiple leaks
of tax haven documents 63—on the role played by tax havens in inequality,
and multiple intergovernmental initiatives, have initiated real changes.
For example, since 2008, the OECD has been engaged in a project known
as the Anti-BEPS (or simply BEPS) project. BEPS stands for “Base Erosion
and Profits Shifting”. 64 BEPS is probably the most expansive internationally
coordinated effort aimed at preventing tax avoidance. 65 It culminated in
multiple recommendations aimed at preventing perceived tax abuses, some
specifically aimed at preventing arbitrage schemes such as the one described
above used by Luxembourg. 66
Even though the BEPS project recommendations are not binding, the
BEPS project definitely changed the discourse about tax avoidance, with the
result of several binding international instruments signed by multiple
61

3.

Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, supra note 59, at

See, e,g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017);
GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS
(2015). Both of the cited books explore the rise of inequality, including the role tax avoidance
and evasion through tax havens play in context.
63
For a discussion on how recent leaks affected legislative changes in multiple
jurisdictions, see Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018).
64
Base Erosion and Profits Shifting, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited
INSERT DATE).
65
Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, supra note 59, at
21.
66
OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, ACTION
2 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
62
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countries. For example, one of BEPS most far-reaching results is the
“Multilateral Instrument” (MLI), a binding instrument aimed at amending,
all at once, thousands of bilateral tax agreements. 67 Another example is a
2010 amendment to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters, which requires an expansive exchange of tax information
between tax authorities regarding the activities of multinational
corporations. 68 The European Union has adopted an EU-wide directive that
implements many of BEPS anti-avoidance recommendations, 69 as well as a
list of “uncooperative tax havens.” 70 Multiple countries have also acted
unilaterally to adopt the BEPS project outcomes. Even the 2017 tax reform
in the United States, 71 implemented—for the first time—measures aimed
specifically at preventing arbitrage of the type describe above. 72 As a result
of such actions, tax havens are not as instrumental as they used to be in
facilitating tax avoidance. Developed economies simply acted to change their
own laws in order to deny the benefits associated with tax avoidance through
tax havens.
Similar anti tax haven trends have been prevalent on the context of tax
evasion. In 2010, the United States Congress enacted the Foreign Tax
Account Compliance Act (“FATCA”). 73 Under FATCA, foreign financial
institutions that operate in the United States must verify whether the
beneficiaries of financial accounts are U.S. taxpayers. If U.S. taxpayers are
identified, the institutions must report the accounts information to the IRS, or
otherwise face a hefty tax on their U.S. income. 74 Even though FATCA
caused international outrage at first—accusing the United States of
overstepping its jurisdiction—multiple other countries have copied the
model, 75 and the OECD specifically acted on the model. The OECD
developed a framework (the CRS noted above) 76 under which financial
institutions share information with tax authorities, and tax authorities share
67
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO
PREVENT BEPS (2016).
68
MCAA, supra note 18.
69
EUROPEAN COMM'N, TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, supra note 19.
70
Common EU List of Third Country Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, EUROPEAN
COMM’N (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_en#heading_1.
71
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
72
See, e.g., §§ 26 U.S.C. 245A, 267A (new provisions denying certain benefits resulting
from debt-equity arbitrage).
73
Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2012).
74
Id.
75
Multiple countries have entered into agreements with the United States to share
information under FTACA. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX
COMPLIANCE
ACT
(FATCA),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx.
76
OECD, supra note 17.
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information with one another. Thus, taxpayers can no longer shield under
banking secrecy laws to avoid detection.
In the face of international pressure and public outrage, tax havens have
even been forced to change their own laws and practices. For example, in
2015 Ireland changed its law defining tax residence of corporations. This was
a result of international pressure due to the fact that the former Irish definition
was used by multinational corporations (“MNCs”) to avoid taxes in other
places. 77 In response to the exchange of information trend, Switzerland
changed its bank secrecy laws to allow its tax authority to share information
with other tax authorities. 78 Luxembourg completely revamped its
administrative tax rulings practices as a result of the LuxLeaks scandal
described above. 79 Multiple tiny tax jurisdictions, which for years owed their
economic existence to the benefits of bank secrecy, now have agreements in
place with the United States, under which they are required to share bank
account information with the IRS. 80
The internationally coordinated effort of developed economies against
tax havens and financial institutions in tax havens is bearing fruit. The age
of the traditional tax haven business model is coming to an end.
IV. THE RISE OF THE BLOCKCHAIN HAVEN
A. Blockchain and Tax Haven Synergies
In a 2013 essay, I laid out a case for the rise of cryptocurrencies as an
alternative for tax havens. 81 The argument was rather straight forward:
cryptocurrencies offer similar advantages to tax evaders offered by tax
havens: no taxation (since cryptocurrencies are decentralized, there is not
central authority to impose tax), and high levels of anonymity (since user
need not identify themselves). Moreover, cryptocurrencies are not as
vulnerable as tax havens to the measures used by developed countries to
battle tax havens. As explained above, anti tax haven measure target tax
havens themselves, and financial institutions operating in tax havens. In other
words, the measures are applied against intermediaries facilitating secrecy
and arbitrage. Cryptocurrencies, in theory, do not need to rely on
Stephen Castle & Mark Scott, Ireland to Phase Out ‘Double Irish’ Tax Break Used
TIMES
(Oct.
14,
2014),
by
Tech
Giants,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/business/international/ireland-to-phase-out-taxadvantage-used-by-technology-firms.html.
78
Michael Shields, Era of Bank Secrecy Ends as Swiss Start Sharing Account Data,
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-secrecy/era-of-banksecrecy-ends-as-swiss-start-sharing-account-data-idUSKCN1MF13O.
79
Patrick Mischo & Franz Kerger, After ‘Lux Leaks’: Welcome Changes to
Luxembourg’s Tax Ruling Practice, 77 TAX NOTES INT'L 1197 (2015).
80
U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 75.
81
Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens, supra note 21.
77
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intermediaries for their successful operation. They are, in their very core, P2P
systems.
This does not mean, however, that tax havens have no role to play in the
blockchain economy. There are several reasons for which traditional tax
haven qualities may have a strong synergistic relationship with blockchainbased applications. First, even though blockchain applications do not
‘require’ intermediaries to operate, intermediaries serve useful purposes in
markets, and as such naturally emerge. 82 For example, not all cryptocurrency
users are tech savvy enough to enable them to efficiently store and exchange
cryptocurrencies. 83 It is easier for most users to use online exchanges or
mobile apps to buy or sell cryptocurrencies. These exchanges may be a target
for regulation and enforcement actions just like traditional financial
intermediaries, and indeed they have been. A recent striking example is the
Coinbase John Doe summons. 84 Coinbase is an online exchange that
facilitates and clears transaction in cryptocurrencies. Suspecting that
cryptocurrency users use Coinbase accounts to evade taxes, the IRS sought
to force Coinbase, and eventually succeeded, to turn over information about
account holder to the IRS.
Traditional tax havens can offer refuge to such intermediaries. They can
promise such blockchain intermediaries the ability to operate away from
regulators in developed countries. Havens can offer an alternative in the form
of unregulated or lightly regulated environment.
Second, most new blockchain ventures must start with entrepreneurs.
Someone has to come up with the idea and draft a business plan. Someone
has to write the code. Even if the eventual application is truly decentralized,
the original entrepreneurial process is not. Again, entrepreneurs may prefer a
low-regulation, low-tax environment to start their venture in, and tax havens
are very good at not regulating, and not imposing tax on such entrepreneurs.
Finally, tax havens are particularly well-suited to serve specific type of
entrepreneurial activities: those that require little or no physical
infrastructure. Tax havens are usually tiny jurisdictions that offer no economy
of scale opportunities. They have minor markets, and relatively small
populations. This means that they cannot support heavy infrastructure
industries. On the other hand, they require a lesser amount of tax revenue to
support relatively small populations and infrastructures. Under the traditional
model, tax havens would effectively support tax avoidance and evasion of
taxpayers in developed jurisdictions, in exchange for a minimal cut of the
Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, supra note
22, at 67.
83
Id.
84
United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-CV-01431-JSC, 2017 WL 5890052 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 28, 2017).
82
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avoided taxes. Thus, for example, tax havens supported tax avoidance simply
by allowing taxpayer to “park” cash in tax haven based accounts. This
requires very little infrastructure.
Blockchain technology offers similar opportunities. Blockchain
applications themselves are virtual, even if they facilitate real world transfers.
They operate via “nodes” scattered worldwide. Except for maybe a few
founding employees, a server or two, and a small space, there is no need for
serious infrastructure. Tax havens can offer that, just as they offered that to
financial institutions.
An important exception to the minimal infrastructure requirements are
“mining” facilities, which stand in the heart of the blockchain verification
process. 85 Miners are users who verify the transaction based on blockchain
in a competitive process that requires computing power. The incentive to
participate in the mining process is the in the form of fees, or newly issued
cryptocurrencies to the miner. Without miners, there is not blockchain. These
may require real infrastructure, and as such are located frequently in high tax
jurisdictions. 86 Such facilities may become the target of tax and other forms
of regulation. However, this course of regulation is not very promising. New
blockchain ventures are already designing decentralized processes without
the need for a heavy physical mining infrastructure. 87
To summarize the points made in this subpart, blockchain technology
may—in theory—replace tax havens in offering a favorable regulatory
environment. Traditionally, tax havens provided a lenient regulatory
environment, which relied on central authority sanctioning such
environment. Blockchain can establish its own regulatory rules, which seem
to dispense of the need for a centrally-sanctioned lenient regulation.
However, even blockchain entrepreneur benefit from operating in a tax haven
85

42.

For an explanation of the mining process, see FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 39–

86
Most large mining facilities are located in developed countries with cold climate, as
the significant processing power requires constant cooling. See, e.g., Rick Noack,
Cryptocurrency Mining In Iceland Is Using So Much Energy, The Electricity May Run Out,
POST
(Feb.
13,
2018),
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/13/cryptocurrencymining-in-iceland-is-using-so-much-energy-the-electricity-may-runout/?utm_term=.1999c2a02292; Jacques Marcoux, Cheap Electricity, Cold Weather Provide
'Huge Marketing Opportunity' For Manitoba To Attract Bitcoin 'Miners', CBC NEWS (Dec.
20, 2017), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-bitcoin-1.4457486.
87
See, e.g., Tezos, which claims its mining processes is resources-efficient, low cost
process. L.M. GOLDMAN, TEZOS: A SELF-AMENDING CRYPTO-LEDGER 8 (2014). (“Because
the thing you must prove to mine is not destruction of existing resources but provision of
existing resources, a proof-of-stake currency does not rely on destroying massive resources
as
it
gains
in
popularity”).
https://tezos.com/static/position_paper841a0a56b573afb28da16f6650152fb4.pdf
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environment. As such, there is a room for tax havens to become “meta” tax
havens. Jurisdictions can allow blockchain entrepreneurs to operate in a way
that allows the blockchain applications to offer the traditional tax haven
benefits.
B. Tax Havens are becoming Cryptocurrency Havens
Many traditional tax havens are indeed taking keen interest in blockchain
technologies, and try to position themselves as leaders in the field. They do
so by offering blockchain entrepreneurs the commodities previously offered
to tax evaders and tax avoiders.
For example, as early as 2014 Switzerland started exploring the
regulatory environment surrounding cryptocurrencies. 88 Identifying the
economic potential of cryptocurrencies, the Swiss government in 2015 acted
to reduce “regulatory barriers for Fintech firms, including providers of
mobile payment systems, virtual currencies, and online peer-to-peer lending,
. . . by amending the Banking Regulation.” 89 Most specifically, Switzerland
exempted certain fin-tech entities that raise funds from the public in an
amount smaller than CHF 1 million, from the need to obtain banking license,
and from regulation by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority.90
This enables ICO issuers to sell digital tokens without being subject to
financial regulation generally applicable to capital raising from the public.
Many ICO also use Swiss foundations as the ICO entity. Under Swiss law,
foundations that receive “donations”, as opposed to “investments” are tax
exempt. It seems that Swiss authorities have been very accepting to the
argument that funds raised in ICOs are donations, rather than investments, an
issue that stirred much controversy. 91
The Swiss model is a perfect example of “a meta tax haven”. It allows
blockchain entrepreneurs to operate almost regulation free, and in many cases
with little or no tax liability. It is not surprising that Switzerland became a
leader in ICOs, and “one of the most popular sites for cryptocurrency and
blockchain startups.” 92 The Swiss canton of Zug is known as “Crypto
Valley.” 93
JENNY GESLEY, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: SWITZERLAND, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/switzerland.php.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Rhodri Davies, I see… Oh! ICOs Crypto Tokens, Swiss Foundations and
AID
FOUNDATION
(Nov.
2,
2017),
Philanthropy,
CHARITIES
https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/blog-home/giving-thought/the-future-of-doing-good/isee-oh-crypto-token-sales-swiss-foundations-and-philanthropy;
Sami
Ahmed,
Cryptocurrency & Robots: How to Tax and Pay Tax on Them, 69 S. C. L. REV. 697, 714–15
(2018).
92
Ahmed, supra note 89, at 714.
93
See CRYPTO VALLEY, https://cryptovalley.swiss/ (last visited INSERT DATE).
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In Malta, the “government has actively encouraged the development of
cryptocurrency…[aiming t]o provide the necessary legal certainty to allow
[the cryptocurrency] industry to flourish.” 94 In 2018, Malta adopted a
complete regulatory framework for blockchain, “designed to make Malta one
of the most desirable locations to set up shop in the blockchain space.” 95
Malta is so well regarded as a location of ICOs, that it has become known as
“Blockchain Island.” 96
Gibraltar, another traditional tax haven, “has actively legislated to
regulate the operation of cryptocurrencies within its jurisdiction.” 97 It also
has its own nickname in the blockchain world: “Crypto Harbor.” 98 Gibraltar
made explicit its light touch stance on blockchain regulations. In 2018, for
example, a senior advisor to the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission
stated” We don’t see a place for us as a regulator, or indeed Gibraltar as a
jurisdiction that makes its own laws, for saying what ‘good’ looks like in
token sales… rather let the marketplace of authorized sponsors come up with
possibly a number of different options of what good looks like.” 99
Crypto Valley, Blockchain Island, and Crypto Harbor are hardly the only
movers. Multiple other tiny jurisdictions—traditionally regarded to as tax
havens—have taken regulatory approaches aimed to encourage the operation
of blockchain startups. These include, for example, the Cayman Islands, 100
the Marshal Islands, 101 Luxembourg, 102 and Anguilla. 103
94
GLOBAL L. RES. DIRECTORATE STAFF, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: MALTA,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2018),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/worldsurvey.php#malta.
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96
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Indeed, recent statistics on ICO clearly demonstrate the disproportionally
large role played by tax havens in the ICO market. For example, a recent
survey of geographical distribution of ICOs 104 finds that that the top 25
jurisdictions in the ICO world (both in terms of funds raised an in terms of
number of ICOs), include known tax havens such as Switzerland, Singapore,
Gibraltar, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, and Myanmar, 105 far outpacing many
developed high-tax economies. Another Survey 106 finds that, by number of
ICOs, the 10 leading jurisdictions for ICOs include Singapore (#2),
Switzerland (#4), Hong Kong (#5), and Gibraltar (#8), with a share of global
ICOs that completely outweighs the proportional size of these jurisdictions
in world economy. A third survey 107 reports that Singapore, Switzerland,
Hong Kong, Netherlands, and the British Territories, account—in the
aggregate—for 36.7% of all global ICOs in 2017-2018 in nominal terms,
again, far outweighing the size of these jurisdictions in the world economy.
Tax havens, so it seems, are gradually transforming into Blockchain
Havens.
V. THE DANGERS OF BLOCKCHAIN HAVENS
As noted above, blockchain technology hold much promise, but also
presents unique risks. 108 This part explores the how the rise of cryptocurrency
havens exacerbates the risks associated with blockchain-based applications.
Subpart A explores the unique characteristics of blockchain technology and
their synergies with tax havens’ regulatory environment. It explains how such
synergies creates an enticing environment for illicit use. Part B provides
some initial data suggesting that Blockchain Havens are already being illicitly
used by some blockchain entrepreneurs.
A. How Blockchain Havens Invite Illicit Blockchain Activity
For purposes of this assessment I define Blockchain Havens as
jurisdictions that offer blockchain entrepreneurs an opportunity to establish
blockchain-ventures with little or no regularity oversight, and with minimal
requirements of identification of owners, participants and beneficiaries of the
venture.
To understand the unique risks that the blockchain-haven jurisdiction
synergy presents, it is helpful to note several important characteristics of
blockchain technology.
ANGUILLA,
LIBRARY
OF
CONGRESS
(2018),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-survey.php#anguilla.
104
Kaal, supra note 42.
105
Id.
106
Zetzsche et. al., supra note 32.
107
HUANG, MEOLI & VISMARA, supra note 41, at 26.
108
FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 45–46 (discussing the dual nature of blockchain,
as a force of both good and evil).
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The first, is disintermediation (or decentralization). 109 No single party
controls the technology, and the technology does not rely on a single party
for operation and maintenance. This means that once a blockchain application
is “released” on the internet, national borders and the regulations that come
in with them become largely irrelevant. A governmental body cannot, for
example, amend or improve a rouge software. The only way to change the
operation of blockchain based software is with the agreement of majority of
the users, 110 of which there may be millions who are scattered across the
globe. This suggests that the best opportunity for regulators to act as
gatekeepers is before a blockchain-based venture starts its operation.
Cryptocurrency havens, however, present themselves as a “lightly regulated”
entry point to the global system, thus enabling blockchain entrepreneur to
completely avoid regulation at the time at which regulation can be the most
potent. Once the blockchain applications is operation, no single
government—including the government of the jurisdiction where the
application was developed—can undo it.
The second important characteristic of the technology is resiliency and
temper-resistance. 111 “Once information has been recorded to a blockchain,
it becomes exceptionally hard to change or delete.” 112 Transactions cannot
simply be canceled. This means that transaction errors, or worse – intentional
misdeed such as fraud—are most likely irreversible once executed. This
makes blockchain-based application particularly attractive as an instrument
for illicit use. Once a fraudster is able to receive illicit gains using a
blockchain-based application, the victim as no recourse. The is no insurance
company, a financial intermediary, or another central body that can
compensate the victim. The only recourse is to try and make the fraudster pay
back the illicit gain. This again demonstrates the importance of regulating the
technology before it becomes operational, and to make sure the code is
written in a way that allows for potential remedies for victims of fraud. But
Cryptocurrency Havens, again, present themselves specifically as the
opposite. They will let the “market decide.” They intentionally avoid
regulating the content of the software.
The problems of irreversibility of blockchain transactions is significantly
exacerbated because blockchain provides pseudonymity to it users. 113 As
explained, one need not identify self in order to become a blockchain user.
“Pseudonimity … creates incentives for parties to engage in unlawful social
See id. at 34–35
Generally speaking, blockchain code can only be changed if majority of the miners
agree to the change (also known as “Hard Fork”). See id. at 187–89.
111
See id. at 35–37
112
Id. at 35.
113
Id. at 38–39.
109
110
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and economic activity. 114
Thus, if—as explained above— the only recourse of a victim against a
blockchain-based fraudster is to recover directly from the fraudster, the fact
that the fraudster can remain anonymous makes the recovery nearly
impossible. Recent coordinated activities against tax havens significantly
hampered tax havens ability to trade in secrecy. 115 But now blockchain
provides the secrecy so coveted by illicit actors. By allowing blockchain
ventures to operate unregulated, Cryptocurrency Haven created a back door
to allow—once again—the trade in secrecy. This problem is expected to
become worse as new blockchain applications are specifically designed to
increase users’ anonymity. 116 This can be prevented only if the jurisdiction
where venture start imposes some limits on anonymity before allowing
blockchain applications to launch. This is not to be expected from
jurisdictions whose entire business model is to benefit from anonymity.
A final characteristic of blockchain technology that makes it particularly
dangerous in the lenient regulatory environment offer by havens, is “the
ability to facilitate the deployment of autonomous software that is not under
the control of one party.” 117 Blockchain enables the autonomous operation of
smart contracts based on objective standards. Once a code is released using
blockchain, there is no stopping it. Consider, for example, a blockchain-based
contract under which million dollars are transferred to a specific account once
a high-level political target is assassinated. Even if the person ordering the
contract changes her mind, she cannot undo the agreement. The hitman still
has the incentive, because the money will be transferred if the contract is
executed. “Autonomous systems need not abide by existing rules and
jurisdictional constraints; they can be designed to bypass or simply ignore the
law of a particular jurisdiction. Once deployed on a blockchain, these systems
will continue to operate . . ..” 118
This again introduces the problem of timing of regulation. Regulation
aimed to prevent the damage done by malicious autonomous code can only
be successful if applied to prevent the release of the code in the first place, or
allow for its correction in a centralized manner. This requires a will to
regulate from the jurisdiction where the blockchain venture operates. And the
regulation itself will require high technical skills – the ability to read and
thoroughly understand the code, in order to make sure it does not contain
malicious autonomous functions. This is not only difficult; it is probably
Id. at 39.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
116
For a description of several projects aiming to increase the anonymity of blockchain
users, see FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 44–45.
117
Id. at 43.
118
Id. at 44.
114
115

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357168

Draft of Mar. 17, 2019
22

Blockchain Havens

beyond the regulatory capability of the tiny jurisdictions that function as
Blockchain Havens.
B. The Illicit Use of Blockchain Havens
1. Illicit Use in General
The dangers described in Subpart above are not theoretical. There is
plenty of anecdotal evidence that blockchain technology is used to facilitate
illegal activity, and that the ICO industry is—to a significant extent—driven
by illicit motives. 119
One of the most well-known examples in recent years is the Silk Road
affair. Silk Road was an online black-market that facilitated illicit
transactions such as sales of drugs, weapons, and fake identification. The
currency used on the website was bitcoin—the first blockchain-based
cryptocurrency—mostly for its anonymous properties. The website was
eventually shut down after an FBI investigation was able to identify Ross
Ulbricht, a U.S. citizen and resident, as the operator of the website. Ulbricht
was convicted of various criminal charges, and sentenced to life without
parole. 120
There is also evidence suggesting that cryptocurrencies are used in tax
evasion. In 2016 the I.R.S. sought a court order to force Coinbase—a U.S.
based cryptocurrency exchange—to divulge information about Coinbase’s
account holder to the IRS. 121 The IRS justified it position by noting that in
each of the years 2013, 2014 and 2015, only about 800 individuals reported
gains from cryptocurrencies transactions to the IRS. 122 Given the vast
popularity of bitcoin in these years, the only logical conclusion was that most
taxpayers who transact in cryptocurrencies simply do not report gains to the
IRS. After a lengthy court battle, Coinbase agreed to reveal to the IRS
information about 13,000 of its account holders, who have traded on
Coinbase in values in excess of $20,000 between 2013 and 2015. 123
The downside of transaction irreversibility has been acutely demonstrated
recently, when the founder of a Canadian cryptocurrency exchange
QuadrigaCX passed away. 124 As it turns out, he was the only person who
knew the passwords to access offline cryptocurrency wallets, and now
For discussion of illicit use of blockchain, see Cohsey, supra note 29.
Andy Greenberg, Silk Road Creator Ulbricht Losses Life Sentence Appeal, WIRED
(May 31, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/silk-road-creator-ross-ulbricht-loses-lifesentence-appeal/.
121
United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-CV-01431-JSC, 2017 WL 5890052 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 28, 2017).
122
Id.
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Id.
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Chris Morris, Cryptocurrency Owners Can't Access Funds After Exchange CEO
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costumers are unable to access $190 million worth of cryptocurrencies. Think
of it as if the only key to your bank vault was held by a person who
disappeared, except that you cannot physically pry open a cryptocurrency
wallet. Some have suggested that the owner has faked his death as part of a
sophisticated fraud scheme. 125
The fraudulent potential of unregulated ICO has also been acutely
demonstrated in a recent paper, which explored whether ICO code actually
delivers on promises made in the ICOs’ white papers. 126 Cohesy et. al. find
that “ICO code and ICO disclosures do not match.” 127 For example, they find
that almost all ICO white papers promise restrictions on token supply, but
only about 2/3 of the ICOs that made such promise actually coded the promise
into the ICO code. 128 Another promise frequently made by ICO issuers, is
that the issuers’ own holding will vest over time, to prevent a pump and dump
schemes. The researchers have found that the majority of ICOs that promised
vesting had no vesting coded into the program. 129 In addition, Cohesy et. al.
find that some ICO issuers had the ability to change the code, even though
such fact was not disclosed in the white paper. As Cohesy et. al aptly
summarize their findings: “no one reads smart contracts.” 130 Indeed, another
recent study finds that as much as 80% of all ICOs in 2017 where fraudulent
schemes. 131
Unlike regular securities offerings, investors ability to monitor issuers is
heavily dependent on technical knowledge in coding, knowledge that most
people simply do not have. This significantly enhances the case for a
sophisticated state regulator to monitor ICOs. But cryptocurrency havens
seem to be taking the exact opposite approach.
2. Illicit Utilization of Blockchain Havens
As explained above, 132 Blockchain Havens seem to claim a disproportional
level of blockchain activity, both in terms of absolute number of ICOs and in
terms of fund raised by ICOs. Does that mean, however, that illicit use of
ICOs can be associated with operating through Blockchain Havens? While a
Yogita Khatri & Stan Higgins, Government Death Certificate Says QuadrigaCX
CEO Died in India, CoinDesk (Feb. 5, 2019) (“Some customers and observers have
expressed skepticism about reports of Cotten’s death, given that QuadrigaCX took more than
a month to disclose it…”). https://www.coindesk.com/indian-death-certificate-cryptoexchange-quadrigacx-death.
126
Cohsey, supra note 29.
127
Id. at 6.
128
Id. at 48.
129
Id. at 50.
130
Id. at 7.
131
Ana Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs Conducted in 2017 Were Scams,
COINTELEGRAPH (July 13, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-says-80percent-of-icos-conducted-in-2017-were-scams.
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full empirical analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this article, I
argue that there is at least suggestive evidence that this is indeed the case.
Since 2018, the Wall Street Journal had maintained a database of ICOs that
present elements of fraudulent activity. 133 I use this data set to try and assess
how much of the suspected ICO activity can be associated with Blockchain
Havens.
Data. The WSJ database classifies an ICO as suspected if it presents at
least one determinant of fraudulent activity. According to the WSJ
methodology, such determinants include: (1) Duplicated language from an
earlier white paper; (2) the ICO has been scrutinize by regulators; (3) The
ICO team seems to be misrepresented or fake; (4) the ICO team is not
disclosed at all in the white paper; (5) the ICO is described in terms of “can't
miss” opportunity; or (6) the ICO website is unavailable. 134
Since 2018, the WSJ has reviewed over 3,300 ICOs, and has identified
513 ICOs that “showed signs of plagiarism, identity theft and promises of
improbable returns.” 135 I examine these suspected ICOs in this Subpart, to
determine whether they can be associated with blockchain havens.
Methodology. To associate a particular ICO with a specific country of
origin, I research ICO Bench—an ICO rating and listing website—for
information about the ICO. 136 If an ICO is not listed on ICO Bench, or no
country information provided, then the following steps are taken: First, I
check the ICO website link from Wall Street Journal to try and locate address
information. If no information is found, other ICO reporting websites are
consulted. 137 If no country information is found, I use other online tools 138 to
assess whether the ICO is listed under the proper name. I also search Twitter,
LinkedIn and Facebook pages purported to belong to the ICO issuers, to try
and identify a geographical location information.
In some cases, the process described above results in different
geographical information reported by different sources. In such cases the ICO
Bench location was selected, unless multiple other sources of information
suggested a different geographical location. I was unable to determine the
geographical origin of 62 ICOs. These ICOs are therefore excluded, resulting
in a dataset of 451 ICOs.
I then code each ICO as a “haven” ICO or “non-haven” ICO based on the
Shane Shifflett & Coulter Jones, Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wannabes Show
STREET
J.
(Jan.
9,
2019),
Hallmarks
of
Fraud,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/graphics/whitepapers/ .
134
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geographical location. I use two alternative tests to determine whether the
ICO jurisdiction is a “haven”.
Under one alternative, I use the list of tax havens jurisdictions identified
by Hines and Rice. 139 This list has consistently been used by academics in
tax havens research, and is considered authoritative. The problem with the
Hines-Rice list is that it relies on tax havens classification by others, and that
it is old. I therefore use a more modern alternative – the Tax Justice Network
Financial Secrecy Index (“FSI”). 140 The FSI “ranks jurisdictions according
to their secrecy and the scale of their offshore financial activities.” I denote a
haven any jurisdiction with a financial secrecy score of 70% or above.
Jurisdictions that are found just around the threshold include, for example,
Hong-Kong (71.05), Gibraltar (70.83), Mauritius (72.35) and the Cayman
Islands (72.28) – all traditionally viewed as tax havens.
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics suggests that a significant
portion of the suspected ICOs are associated with a haven jurisdiction. Using
the Hines-Rice list as are haven jurisdiction indicator, 108 suspected ICOs—
23.85% of the total—are haven based. Using the FSI to determine the status
of the jurisdiction, 145 suspected ICOs—32.18% of the total—are havenbased.
This results suggest that a significant number of suspected ICOs—
between 23.85% and 32.18%—are executed through Blockchain Havens.
Moreover, a recent ICO Bench report suggest that in absolute numbers, only
about 13% of all ICOs are executed through tax havens. 141 It thus seems that
haven based ICOs are more likely to be suspect than non-haven ICOs.
The chart below summarizes the countries that lead the issuances of
suspected ICOs. The gray data points represent jurisdictions listed as tax
havens by Hines & Rice.

James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice, Foreign Tax Havens and American Business,
109 Quar. J. of Econ’s 149, 178 (1994).
140
https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/
141
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Caveats. This exploratory data is obviously just that – exploratory. It
should not be construed as a full blown statistical analysis suggesting that
suspected ICOs are more likely to be operated through haven jurisdiction.
Such an analysis would be beyond the scope of the article. It should also be
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noted that in some instances, I found discrepancies with the WSJ dataset. For
example, some ICOs who were classified has having no website by the WSJ,
seem to have had a perfectly functioning website.
However, that data presented is—at the minimum—suggestive that
Blockchain Haven jurisdictions attract suspected blockchain activity to a
significant extent.
VI. WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DO ABOUT
CRYPTO-HAVENS?
C. Current Responses by the International Community
When confronted with unacceptable tax haven practices, developed
jurisdiction acted in a coordinated manner against the tax havens themselves,
or against the financial institutions operating in tax havens. Coordination is
necessary in such context, because a few bad jurisdictions can topple the
entire effort. After all, criminals do not need many places to hide their illicit
gain. One or few safe havens can do the trick. There is a need for all
jurisdictions to cooperate to prevent a race to the bottom.
Such a coordinated approach is much more challenging in the
cryptocurrency haven context, given the unique decentralized, semianonymous nature of the technology. This is demonstrated by the apparent
difficulty of the international community to engage this issue meaningfully.
Even though some in the intergovernmental community have already
identified the need for a coordinated effort, there has been little progress in
this area. In December 2018 the OECD submitted a report to the G20 meeting
in Buenos Aires, Argentina. 142 The report states that the OECD is still in the
preliminary stages of “analysing the risks and possible responses” to “cryptoassets,” with an updated report scheduled for 2019 and a finalized report by
2020. 143 The OECD’s research is part of a larger project looking into the tax
challenges arising from digitalization. 144 It is clear from the report that “no
consensus was reached on the broader tax challenges associated with
digitalization.” 145
The G20, in turn, stated in its joint declaration that countries need to
“regulate crypto-assets for anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism in line with FATF [Financial Action Task Force]
standards.” 146 FATF has yet to issue any specific standards governing
OECD SECRETARY-GENERAL REPORT TO THE G20 LEADERS, BUENOS AIRES,
ARGENTINA (Dec. 2018)
142
143
144

(2018)

Id., at 10.
OECD, BRIEF ON THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION: INTERIM REPORT 2-4
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cryptocurrencies outside applying general anti money laundering
requirements. 147 Even FATF’s own report acknowledges that its
recommendations are confusing to governments and the private sector. 148 As
for the case of taxation, the joint declaration simply echoes the OECD, stating
that countries “will continue to work together to seek a consensus-based
solution to address the impacts of the digitalization of the economy on the
international tax system with an update in 2019 and a final report by 2020.” 149
Similarly, other inter-governmental bodies have made little progress in
formulating international policy to govern cryptocurrencies. The
International Organization of Securities Commissions held a meeting in 2017
to “discuss the growing usage of ICOs to raise capital as an area of
concern.” 150 The result of this meeting was a bulletin board displaying each
country’s individual ICO regulations, and an “ICO Consultation Network
through which members can discuss their experiences and bring their
concerns, including cross-border issues, to the attention of fellow
regulators.” 151
The U.S. recently joined the Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (the
“J5”) – a five-member partnership between the Australian Criminal
Intelligence Commission and Australian Taxation Office, the Canada
Revenue Agency, the Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst in the
Netherlands, the U.K.’s HM Revenue & Customs and the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service criminal investigation division. 152 The J5’s mission
statement explicitly lists “cryptocurrencies and cybercrime” as targets for
enforcement. Specifically, the J5 aims to coordinate efforts “to track down
those people who make a living out of facilitating and enabling international
tax crime.” 153 However, there has been no mention of formulating any sort of
coordinated regulatory policy governing cryptocurrency taxation.
In summary, current global efforts to address the challenges presented by
blockchain technology are sporadic, confused, and seem to be at a primordial
stage. In the next part, I explore three potential avenues for a coordinated
international regulatory approach: The laissez-faire approaches, the reactive
(2018)

147 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF
TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION: THE FTAF RECOMMENDATIONS 15 (2018).
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approach, and the proactive approach.
D. Potential Approaches for the International Regulation of Blockchain
Havens
1. Let the Market Work
The very birth of the blockchain technology is in libertarian principles.
One might argue it is sensible to let the market run its course. Unsuccessful
blockchain technologies will disappear, and good ones will prevail.
While sensible to a certain extent, such an approach fails to capture the
danger in the irreversibility for blockchain transactions. Fraudulent gains are
likely to never be returned. There is no single entity to recover from, nor there
is an issuer can be identified. The market has no ability “to correct” for a oneoff fraudulent events.
One market based solution that may contribute is to create of blockchain
expert intermediaries who will evaluate the quality of the blockchain code,
compare it with white paper promises, and grade the ICO quality. Rating
agencies for blockchain ICOs, if you will.
While this is desirable, such solution may fall short for the same reasons
that credit rating agencies sometime fail. In addition, unlike in the case of
credit rating agencies, correction of rating in retrospect is likely to be
meaningless due to the finality of transaction. In addition, rating agencies
may only be useful for rating ICOs or other public crowd-based applications.
Blockchain can be used privately for illicit purposes (such as drug trafficking,
and tax evasion). In such a context, code-quality regulation is meaningless.
2. The Reactive Approach
For the same reasons for which a free market approach falls short, so does
a reactive regulatory approach. As explained above, once blockchain-based
software has entered the global web environment, it is very difficult to undo.
A reactive approach may result in an excessive regulatory response. If a
malicious software is “released to the wild” and is automatically designed to
operate in a way that a government may deem disruptive, no government can
just “shut down”, or amend the code. The only way to stop the malicious code
from operating within the jurisdiction is to physically prevent its operation.
For example, if it is known that a blockchain program is designed to shut
down the power grid on a specific date, it is not possible to stop it by changing
the program. One would have to prevent the program from using the internet
to execute its operation. Either you take the grid off the internet, or you
identify the physical source of the program (such as a specific server), and
disallow internet traffic into the jurisdiction from the sever. This, however,
may not be possible given that it is likely that the blockchain code operates
through multiple online nodes.
Moreover, such heavy-handed regulatory approach may hinder the
positive aspects of blockchain based applications. For example, in the
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extremes, a jurisdiction may seek to completely blocking any internet traffic
associated with decentralized ledgers in order to stop undesired operations.
Several regimes in countries with authoritarian tendencies have already taken
similar approaches. 154
Finally, these shortcomings do not mean the ex-ante regulation should be
abandoned altogether. There is still room to try and punish criminals, or
recover from their illicit gains. But this must be supplanted by preventative
medicine, as explained below.
3. The Proactive Approach
Given the unique nature of blockchain technology, it seems prudent to
take an ex-ante approach, namely, to regulate blockchain application before
they are released. Only at that point in time there are still intermediaries
susceptible to regulation: The entrepreneurs, and the jurisdictions in which
they operate.
But in order for such regulation to be successful, an intentionally
coordinated approach must be taken. As in the case of tax havens, any one
jurisdiction that breaks ranks can serve as an entry-point of unregulated
blockchain software to the World Wide Web, in which case damage control
efforts may prove futile.
But what might such a coordinated approach include? A compressive plan
for international regulation of blockchain based applications is well beyond
this article, but some key points are discussed below, while considering the
problematic characteristics of blockchain.
For example, the problem of inability to regulate decentralized networks
is addressed by the very meta-framework offered here: ex-ante regulation.
This means regulating the issuers of ICOs, the programmers and the venture
capitalist financing such ventures at the early stages of the project. In any
case, before the application is turned on.
The problem of pseudonymity can be addressed by subjected jurisdictions
or financial institutions that host blockchain ventures, to certain “know your
costumer rules”. Such rules must enable the jurisdictions in which blockchain
ventures operate to identify the individuals involved with the venture, and to
report their identities to interested authorities in other jurisdictions.
The problem of irreversibility of transactions is partly remedied by
disclosure and identification rules, as it may enable victims of fraud to
identify the wrongdoers. A better way to address such issues is to require
blockchain ventures to underwrite the risk of their venture. This can be
achieved by insurance requirements, or by writing some sort of an escrow
into the code. Such escrow would be automatically activated to compensate
victims under certain circumstances.
Some countries completely ban blockchain operations. See Pinsent Mason, supra
note 30, at 14.
154
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In the case of ICOs, it is prudent to come up with a standard disclosure
requirement, and a requirement for a regulator to compare the disclosure with
the actual code.
What the best forum is for such a coordination remains to be seen. In the
global battle against tax havens, the best was, for the most part, the OECD.
The OECD has recently launched the blockchain policy forum, and this may
be a proper venue to initiate such a project. 155 But wherever it happens, it
needs to happen sooner rather than later, before multiple malicious
blockchain applications take hold. Any delay is likely to bring about the worst
in blockchain, and prevent the best in it from ever materializing.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper explored the rise of Blockchain Havens—jurisdiction that
attract blockchain entrepreneurs by offering refuge from tax and regulation.
Many of these jurisdictions are traditional tax havens, whose business model
has been severely affected by recent international efforts to battle offshore
financing.
It seems that these jurisdictions gravitate towards a new model, where the
benefits of secrecy and lax regulation are offered to blockchain entrepreneurs,
rather than to tax cheats. Since blockchain is a largely anonymous and selfregulated network, blockchain can offer illicit users the traditional benefits of
tax havens. Blockchain Havens are thus best described as meta-tax-havens.
The unique characteristics of blockchain technology—in particular,
decentralization, temper resistance—make it almost impossible to regulate
after the fact. It is therefore an inviting environment for illicit users, as
recourse is next to impossible. Regulation therefor must come first, before
blockchain applications start to operate.
Since any one Blockchain Haven can independently offer unregulated
entry-point for malicious blockchain applications, there is a need for a
coordinated international effort to prevent a regulatory race to the bottom.

See Webcast: OECD Blockchain Policy Forum (Sept.
http://www.oecd.org/finance/oecd-blockchain-policy-forum-2018.htm.
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